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A SUMMARY EVALUATION 
OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT 
CLYDE W. SUMMERS 
AFTER ten years of Taft-Hartley, it is 
time to look back; but looking back 
can be a deadly indulgence. If we seek 
to justify our past, or if we long to re- 
turn, we can like Lot's wife be turned to 
a pillar of salt standing helpless on the 
desert. Our backward glance is deadening 
unless we look through the past to see 
guidelines for the future. Our appraisal 
must be more than a judgment of 
whether the Act has succeeded or failed 
-it must give us wisdom to go forward. 
It should give us greater insight as to 
future steps in the development of labor 
law. 
The Act has remained substantially 
unchanged for ten years. This does not 
prove its validity, but may only demon- 
strate the obstacles to legislating in the 
field of labor-management relations. 
Certain defects in the statute and the 
need for clarifying or corrective legis- 
lation have been painfully obvious. The 
thicket of words in Section 8(d) which 
purports to define the duty to bargain has 
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baffled the Board and the courts for ten 
years;' the latent vacuity of Section 301, 
which allows suits for breach of contracts, 
was laid bare by the Supreme Court in 
the Westinghouse case;2 the disruptive 
impact of the closed shop provisions on 
the building trades has been uniformly 
recognized; the wishful optimism of the 
cession clause in Section 10(a) produced 
a foreboding fear of a "no-man's land" 
between federal and state power, and 
now the Supreme Court's barbed wire en- 
tanglements have made that fear a real- 
ity.3 In spite of all these patent defects, 
political pressures have brought no cor- 
rective action but only legislative paraly- 
sis. In this area the interests are so strong 
and so deeply held that the gradual 
evolving of legislation is impossible. We 
do not move by small steps but rather by 
sporadic leaps. The last ten years have 
emphasized the need to legislate with the 
greatest care and foresight, for even bad 
provisions may live long. 
It is not the purpose of this article to 
make a personal judgment of the worth 
of the statute, for that would reveal only 
the personal scale of values against which 
'For a brief sketch of some of the conflicting 
views this section has generated, see Justice 
Frankfurter's concurring opinion in NLRB v. 
Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957). 
2Westinghouse Salaried Employees Ass'n. v. 
Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955). 
3Guss v. Utah State Labor Relations Board, 
353 U.S. 1 (1957). 
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the statute is measured. The purpose 
here is rather to appraise the statute 
according to the values sought to be 
achieved by those who drafted and 
enacted it. We may thereby gain greater 
insight as to the implications of those 
objectives and the effectiveness of various 
legal means in achieving them. 
In the drafting of the Act at least four 
separate goals were explicitly stated. The 
first was, in the words of the Senate Com- 
mittee Report, "to equalize existing 
laws"4 in order to establish "the equality 
of bargaining power necessary to main- 
tain industrial peace."5 The second goal 
was, in the words of the preamble, "to 
protect the rights of individual em- 
ployees in their relations with labor 
organizations."6 The third was to protect 
"neutrals"-described by Senator Taft as 
"third persons who are wholly uncon- 
cerned in the disagreement."7 The fourth 
goal was to obtain stability in labor rela- 
tions by making collective agreements 
binding with effective legal sanctions. 
These were the stated objectives; the 
question is, to what extent has the stat- 
ute succeeded in achieving these objec- 
tives, and to what extent has it failed? 
If we can understand more clearly why 
it has succeeded or failed, we may know 
better how to legislate in the future. 
UNION-MANAGEMENT EQUALITY 
The first stated goal, achieving equal- 
ity between unions and management, was 
blurred by confusing legal equality and 
economic equality. The sense of injustice 
rooted in the "one-sidedness" of the Wag- 
ner Act led to a demand that both parties 
4Report of the Senate Committee on Labor 
and Public Welfare, S. Rep. No. 105, 80th Cong., 
1st Sess. (1947), p. 2. 
"Ibid. 
"Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 
Sec. 1. 
7Cong. Rec., 80th Cong. 1st Sess., Vol. 93 Part 
3 April 29, 1947, p. 4323. 
should be equally subject to legal re- 
straints. To some extent the statute 
accomplished this form of equality. The 
unfair labor practice of employer re- 
straint and coercion under Section 8(a)(1) 
was partially matched by a similar re- 
striction on unions in Section 8(b)(1). 
The employer's duty to bargain was im- 
posed in equal terms on the union. The 
union and the employer were made sub- 
ject to the same rules of free speech. 
Although these forms of equality pro- 
vide an aesthetically appealing symmetry, 
they may ignore vital differences. There 
is danger in following the old saw that 
"what is sauce for the goose is sauce for 
the gander," lest we blindly assume there 
is no difference between the two-which 
may come as quite a surprise to both the 
goose and the gander! The Board's cap- 
tive-audience rule, giving unions and 
management equal freedom to have cap- 
tive audiences, is a kind of spurious 
equality that assumes that both the goose 
and the gander can lay eggs. The formal- 
ly equalizing words of Section 8(b)(1) 
have cast a cloud over the traditional 
union weapon of organizational picket- 
ing which has no equivalent in employer 
practices. The attempt of Section 8(d) to 
define simultaneously the duty of the 
union and the employer to bargain has 
contributed to the welter of complica- 
tions in interpreting that clause. Perhaps 
from these experiences we can learn that 
matching statutory words will not estab- 
lish legal equality between such diverse 
entities as unions and management-that 
there is a difference between the goose 
and the gander. 
Beyond the goal of legal equality was 
the more significant desire to equalize 
bargaining power. This reflects a deeply 
felt need that collective bargaining works 
best when the economic strength of the 
employer is matched by the economic 
strength of the union. There were claims 
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that "some of the practices under the 
Wagner Act tend to destroy the balance 
of power in collective bargaining.s This 
claim, however, overlooks at least two 
pre-1947 rules which were based on 
the premise of equalizing bargaining 
strength. The Board's rule that economic 
strikers who were permanently replaced 
during the strike were not entitled to 
reinstatement at the end of the strike 
was based explicitly on the grounds that 
this equalized the employer's ability to 
meet the strike situation. Also, in deter- 
mining the appropriate unit, the Board 
customarily considered the effect of the 
size or nature of the unit on the parties' 
relative bargaining strength and fre- 
quently established multiple-plant units 
in order that unions would have effective 
bargaining power. These modest efforts 
seemed to be insufficient o satisfy the 
drafters of Taft-Hartley. They declared a 
desire to do more. 
The puzzling fact is that, in spite of 
the stated objective, a search of the stat- 
ute discloses few clauses which even 
point in this direction. On the contrary, 
by providing for greater fracturing of 
appropriate units into craft groups, 
guard groups, and professional employ- 
ees, the Act destroys ome of the flexibil- 
ity of the Board and may, in certain 
circumstances at least, tend to destroy the 
equality of bargaining power which 
might otherwise be achieved. 
There is no evidence that after ten 
years the bargaining power of unions and 
employers is more evenly matched than 
before. Industrial unions in the North 
may be stronger in proportion to man- 
agement than they were ten years ago, 
but in the South unions may be weaker 
in proportion to management than they 
were ten years ago. Some unions have 
become stronger and others have become 
8Supra, note 5. 
weaker, but there is no evidence that the 
changes have been in the direction of 
achieving a balance with management. 
The underlying difficulty is that equal- 
ity in bargaining power is largely a 
product of economic forces and not legal 
rules. The helplessness of a small inde- 
pendent laundry in the face of the Team- 
sters is an economic fact, and the 
weakness of the Retail Clerks in dealing 
with Woolworth or Kresge is not readily 
remedied by statutory amendments. The 
Textile Workers Union in the South is 
too weak to bargain effectively, while the 
textile manufacturer in the North can 
scarcely survive. These are economic 
problems; relative strength is an eco- 
nomic fact. The ability of the law to 
work changes is limited. 
More important, a balance is achieved 
only by allowing government to put its 
hand on one or the other side of the 
scale, but this is one of the very things 
which we fear most-to have govern- 
ment injecting its hand into the bargain- 
ing relationship in order to juggle the 
scales. The failure of Taft-Hartley to 
achieve its first objective was the failure 
of the drafters to recognize the implica- 
tions of what they sought, and to face 
them frankly. Oratorical appeals to 
"equality" substituted for hard wrestling 
with real problems. The stubborn fact 
that such equality could be achieved only 
by a degree of governmental interference 
which the drafters themselves deplored 
was glossed over with platitudes and 
ambiguities. This does not deny the real- 
ity of the problem; it only teaches the 
necessity for a clear understanding of its 
nature. 
PROTECTION OF INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS 
One of the most pervasive purposes of 
the Act was to protect the rights of the 
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individual against his union.9 Some of 
the sponsors termed it a "Bill of Rights 
for union members." Members were 
given control over union decisions by 
requiring votes on union shop clauses 
and on the employer's last offer in nation- 
al emergency strikes. Both of these back- 
fired. In union shop elections, the unions 
won 97 percent of the elections and 
amassed a favorable vote of 80 percent 
of all eligible voters.10 This provision 
tended to displace bargaining on the 
issue, for 10 to 1 votes were impossible 
for either unions or management to ig- 
nore.11 After three years the very ones 
who sponsored the union shop election 
urged its abolition because it had ob- 
structed bargaining and encouraged the 
extension of union security clauses. 
Worker approval of the union's action 
was equally overwhelming in the em- 
ployer last-offer votes.12 The tedium of 
runaway majorities was broken only by 
the comic relief of the inability of the 
government, in the American Locomo- 
tive case, to find the last offer on which 
to vote. These votes too have tended to 
harden bargaining positions at just the 
stage where pressures for compromise 
should be the greatest, and the wisdom of 
eliminating the provision is now gen- 
erally conceded. 
This experience does not prove that 
"The Conference Report spoke of giving "fur- 
ther protection to the individual worker against 
arbitrary action by the union" by the union shop 
clause of 8(a)(3). H.R. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong. 
1st. Sess. p. 41. Amendments to 9(b) were justified 
on the basis of "recognizing and protecting the 
rights and interests of individuals and minori- 
ties." Id. at p. 47. 
'Thirteenth NLRB Ann. Rep. for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1948, p. 2; 14 Ann. Rep., 
p. 8; 15 Ann. Rep., p. 12. 
"1John A. Hogan, "The Meaning of the Union 
Shop Elections," Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (April 1949), p. 319. 
12Herbert S. Parnes, Union Strike Votes, Cur- 
rent Practice and Proposed Controls, Princeton, 
1956, p. 105. 
workers mass-mindedly agree with their 
union officers, or that they follow like 
sheep. It does demonstrate that if work- 
ers are required by law to vote on their 
union's demands, they consider it a pub- 
lic declaration of their choice between 
their union leaders and the employer. 
For the worker, that choice is obvious. 
The vote is not only futile, but tends to 
solidify the leaders' position and stifle 
protests within the union. 
Another method of protecting the indi- 
vidual was to give him a degree of inde- 
pendence from control by the majority 
union. The priviso in Section 9(a), giving 
the individual a right to process his own 
grievance, was amended to repudiate 
previous decisions of the Board and to 
create in the individual an independent 
right to enforce the collective bargaining 
agreement on his own behalf. He was 
given the right to process his grievance 
"without intervention of the bargaining 
representative" to insure that his rights 
under the contract would not be sur- 
rendered or compromised.'3 This pro- 
vision has proved of little worth. Unions 
dislike individual grievances for it tends 
to undermine their authority, and most 
employers prefer that all grievances be 
regularized by processing through the 
union procedure. Also, employers are not 
anxious to antagonize the union by grant- 
ing a claim which the union rejects. 
Encouraged by a questionable ruling of 
the General Counsel,14 unions and em- 
ployers have negotiated clauses explicitly 
prohibiting the right of the individual to 
process his grievance, thereby bargaining 
away the individual's statutory right. 
The experience under this section sug- 
gests that employers are not always 
vigilant protectors of individual rights. 
The employer seeks trouble-free produc- 
"3S. Rep., p. 24. 
14Admin. Rul. Case No. 317; Case No. 418 
(1952). 
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tion, not unnecessary disputes. It further 
suggests that the protection of individual 
or minority rights is extremely difficult 
if these rights conflict with the mutual 
interests of the employer and the union. 
Statutory provisions intended to protect 
these rights must be crystal-clear and 
specially designed to prevent circum- 
vention. 
The individual is also given a degree 
of independence by the union security 
clauses of Sections 8(a)(3) and 8(b)(2). 
These were explicitly designed "to meet 
numerous examples of glaring disregard 
for the rights of minority members of 
unions''15-exclusion of Negroes, admis- 
sion only of sons of members, and ex- 
pulsion of those who opposed the union 
leadership. Although the clause does 
give broad protection to job rights, it 
does not give the individual any right to 
participate in the affairs of his union. 
Negroes can still be relegated to subsid- 
iary locals and have their contracts nego- 
tiated by all-white locals. Opponents can 
still be expelled and politically sterilized. 
Even job protection is not complete, for 
the union may induce the employer to 
discharge individuals because they are 
"left-wingers," or because they don't 
drive a Studebaker. Union democracy is 
not encouraged or protected, and the 
individual is left helpless in the face of 
union-management cooperation. 
These, however, suggest only the loop- 
holes in the law-its gross failure to meet 
its stated objective. The real failure of 
the law is that it has not been obeyed. 
The closed shop and hiring hall are still 
standard practice in the construction in- 
dustry and are only thinly disguised in 
printing, longshore, and maritime. In the 
building trades the established practice 
of the unions and employers is to ignore 
the law, pay any claims filed, and keep 
"ES. Rep., p. 7. 
away from the courts. The very indus- 
tries in which the abuses were most 
severe have not changed their ways. 
The moral here again is that it is diffi- 
cult to legislate against union-manage- 
ment cooperation, but the problem runs 
much deeper. The closed shop, closed 
union, and hiring hall-an inseparable 
trilogy-persist because of practical needs 
of both unions and employers. In indus- 
tries where employment is short-term, 
seniority structures are impossible. Those 
workers who are established in the 
industry seek priority of job rights by 
requiring that new entrants wait until 
established workers are employed. The 
auto worker, the steel worker, and even 
the office worker has his seniority clause 
which gives him job priority. In these 
industries there is no "free labor mar- 
ket"; a man cannot get a job where he 
wants it. For the hodcarrier, the bricklay- 
er, or the carpenter, the closed shop tril- 
ogy provides his substitute for seniority. 
The statute attempted to wipe out all 
this and substituted nothing it its place. 
This desperate need for job priority can- 
not thus be wished away with a wand of 
words. The employers' need is nearly as 
compelling. In these industries the em- 
ployer needs a pool of labor on which to 
draw on short notice; he cannot advertise 
or even maintain an adequate personnel 
department. The hiring hall is a prac- 
tical and proven solution. 
The Taft-Hartley Act gave no recog- 
nition to these stubborn economic facts. 
Where there were genuine economic 
needs of the parties, it attempted to 
create a vacuum. It blandly assumed that, 
if the union were prohibited from having 
a closed shop, the employers would pro- 
tect the individuals. The signal lesson 
of the Taft-Hartley Act is that when the 
union's needs are acute, and when the 
employer's needs or desires for coopera- 
tion are strong, legal measures must be 
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carefully constructed to permit the creat- 
ing of new institutions to meet the genu- 
ine needs. If the individual is to be 
protected, both unions and management 
need to be told clearly that they cannot 
interfere with his rights even though it 
is to their mutual advantage, and strin- 
gent measures must be provided to curb 
their interlocking interests. 
PROTECTION OF NEUTRALS 
The third stated objective of Taft- 
Hartley was the protection of "neutrals." 
This was sought through the unfair labor 
practices defined in Section 8(b)(4) and 
the equivalent damage actions provided 
by Section 303. These provisions have 
had substantial effect in reducing the use 
of secondary pressures, and their impact 
is reflected in the number of cases which 
the Board has handled. Again, one of the 
most troublesome problems has been 
union-management cooperation, this 
time in the form of "hot cargo" clauses. 
Beyond this, the problems have centered 
on defining who is "neutral," particu- 
larly in cases involving construction 
projects, truck trailing, and "unfair lists." 
These problems are but symptomatic 
of the more fundamental difficulty in 
defining neutrals in labor disputes. Col- 
lective bargaining depends ultimately, in 
some situations, on a trial of strength. 
When the employer and the union can- 
not agree, other people get hurt-the 
railroad loses its shipper, the parts-sup- 
plier loses his customer, and the customer 
is denied the product. The economy in- 
evitably transmits the shock to innocent 
parties, "persons who are wholly uncon- 
cerned in the disagreement." This is the 
price we pay for free collective bargain- 
ing; this is a cost which we deem prefer- 
able to government intervention. The 
basic fallacy of this appealingly worded 
objective of protecting "neutrals" is that 
it is at war with the inherent character 
of collective bargaining. 
The secondary boycott provisions were 
constructed on the principle that some- 
how a little circle could be drawn around 
the conflict, and that the conflict could 
then take place solely within the circle. 
It seems more sensible to face quite 
openly the fact that outsiders are going 
to be hurt. Insofar as there is any attempt 
to quarantine the dispute, the quarantine 
should not be based on moralistic 
grounds that innocents will be injured. 
Instead, the bounds of quarantine should 
be defined so as to achieve other objec- 
tives of the statute, particularly that of 
equalizing bargaining power. 
The Board and the courts, when faced 
with concrete situations instead of mis- 
leading moral abstractions, have attempt- 
ed to shape the statute to promote 
bargaining equality. In the Ebasco case,'6 
the court held that when a struck em- 
ployer moved work to another company, 
the union could follow the struck goods 
and picket at the other plant. If this 
were not permitted, the union would not 
have equality of bargaining power. In the 
Royal Typewriter case,'7 a business 
machine company which was on strike 
farmed out its service contracts to inde- 
pendent repair firms. When the union 
picketed these secondary employers, the 
Board upheld the right of the union to 
bring economic pressure against "allies." 
Otherwise the union's economic force 
would be lost. When the Teamsters in 
Buffalo had a dispute with an association 
of linen supply companies, they struck 
one of the companies, but allowed the 
others to operate-a divide and conquer, 
or "whipsaw" device. The employers 
countered by all ceasing operation. The 
'6Douds v. Metropolitan Federation of Archi- 
tects, 75 F. Supp. 672 (S.D. N.Y., 1948). 
17NLRB v. Business Machines Mechanics, 228 
Fed. 553 (2d Cir., 1955). 
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Board's ultimate conclusion, affirmed by 
the Supreme Court, was that small em- 
ployers who bargained as a single unit 
could combine their forces to meet the 
onslaught of a strong union.18 If the 
union struck one, the rest could present 
a solid front by closing down in a sym- 
pathy lockout. Crocodile tears for the 
poor employees who did not go out on 
strike, but who were nevertheless locked 
out by their employer, avail nothing. 
They were innocents, in a sense, but they 
were not immune from loss due to the 
processes of collective bargaining. 
The objective of protecting "neutrals" 
has strong emotional appeal akin to a 
moral principle, but to legislate on this 
basis is to ignore economic realities. Such 
slogans only divert us from the difficult 
problems of defining the boundaries of 
the dispute in such a way as to promote 
objectives which improve the function- 
ing of our collective bargaining system. 
SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS 
The fourth objective of the statute was 
to provide for sanctity of contracts. Un- 
derlying this was a broader objective of 
providing for stability of labor relations 
during the contract term. Section 8(d) 
sought to provide stability by requiring 
that the contract continue in full force 
and effect for sixty days after notice of 
termination or until the expiration date, 
whichever is later. It also explicitly stated 
that a party was not required to discuss 
modifications during the contract term. 
This section was supplemented by Sec- 
tion 301 which provides for suits for 
breach of contract. 
The major weakness of these sections 
has been their defective draftsmanship. 
The murky wording of Section 8(d) has 
led the Board and the courts to an assort- 
ment of interpretations, and only now 
'mNLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 
449, 353 U.S. 87 (1957). 
after ten years do some glimmers of light 
begin to show through. The source of 
the confusion was the failure of the 
drafters to consider the wide variety of 
fact situations which might arise and to 
determine how each type of situation 
should be handled. The Board and the 
courts had to find the intent of the draft- 
ers who had not given enough thought 
to have an intent. The various wording 
of Section 301 was likewise a product of 
failure to think through the legal prob- 
lems. The Westinghouse case19 cast a 
shadow across the section for two years; 
the Lincoln Mills decision20 removed the 
shadow but left a host of questions that 
will plague the courts for years. The most 
elementary lesson is plain-collective 
bargaining is a complicated process, and 
it operates in an intricate complex of le- 
gal rules and procedures. The drafting of 
statutes requires the greatest care and 
intensive examination for dangerous gaps 
and booby traps. Perhaps the inherent 
problem is that the legislative process as 
it now functions is incapable of meeting 
the severe demands placed upon it in 
developing statutes in this area. 
The sanctity of contract and stability 
of relationships has not been furthered 
by the Supreme Court's interpretation 
of these sections. Most thought-provok- 
ing is the Mastro Plastics Products Com- 
pany case,2l in which the union struck 
during the contract term because the 
employer had discharged a man for 
union activity. Although the union had 
two legal remedies-a suit for breach of 
contract and a charge of unfair labor 
practice-the Court upheld the union's 
right to strike. Neither the no-strike 
clause (lacking an explicit prohibition of 
unfair labor practice strikes) nor the 
'9Supra note 2. 
n0Textile Workers Union of America, v. Lin- 
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
2'Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 
(1956). 
This content downloaded  on Tue, 12 Mar 2013 00:09:57 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
412 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
statutory no-strike provisions of Section 
8(d) barred the union from using self- 
help. In spite of the words and spirit of 
the statute, recourse to the law of the 
jungle was still countenanced during the 
contract term. 
Far more effective in defeating this 
objective of the statute has been the con- 
duct of the parties themselves. Imme- 
diately after the passage of the Act, John 
L. Lewis led the way by negotiating his 
famous "ready, willing, and able to 
work" clause. Over 40 percent of the con- 
tracts now have clauses which protect the 
unions from liability under Section 301.22 
The Lion Oil case23 has now opened an 
escape route for the parties to avoid the 
strictures of Section 8(d) by including a 
clause allowing for reopening on sixty 
days' notice. Even where contracts have 
effective clauses, employers have under- 
standably been reluctant to enforce them 
with vigor. Again, the process of collec- 
tive bargaining has significantly limited 
the impact of the statutory provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
It is reasonably clear that none of the 
objectives of the framers of the Act has 
been achieved in full measure. Sanctity 
of contracts has measurably increased, 
although it is debatable whether this has 
been due more to the temper of the times 
than to the impact of the jumbled legal 
provisions. Individuals have gained a 
small measure of protection. Equality of 
bargaining strength, a real and pressing 
need, has not been achieved, while the 
false objective of protecting neutrals has 
been vigorously pursued without any 
consideration of the possibility that limit- 
ing the scope of the conflict might be 
used constructively to help equalize bar- 
gaining power. 
2Bureau of National Affairs, Contract Clause 
Finder 77:151-155. 
mNLRB v. Lion Oil Co., 352 U.S. 282 (1957). 
Running through the whole problem 
of legislating in the field of union-man- 
agement relations is a continuous 
struggle between the demands for gov- 
ernment intervention in collective bar- 
gaining and the demands for the freedom 
of the parties to make their own choices. 
The parties' choices are dictated by 
economic facts, not political or social 
values. To impose those values by legis- 
lation requires a full recognition of the 
parties' economic needs and the pressures 
which motivate them. The legal measures 
must either meet those needs, divert the 
pressures, or be forceful enough to com- 
pel the parties to bow to the social values 
sought by the legislation. The drafters 
of Taft-Hartley failed to reckon with the 
nature and strength of the economic 
forces and institutions involved. Employ- 
ers were entrusted with protecting indi- 
vidual rights, job priority systems in 
transient industries were ordered to dis- 
appear, equality was desired with no 
critical thought of whether or how it 
might be achieved, and stability was 
sought without serious consideration 
whether it should be optional or com- 
pulsory on the parties. 
Ten years have made clear that the 
mutual interests of union and manage- 
ment cannot be easily defeated by legal 
measures. Individual rights within the 
collective structure cannot be protected 
by half measures, because such rights 
frequently run counter to the desires of 
both collective parties. It is both a warn- 
ing and an encouragement that free col- 
lective bargaining has a far greater 
reservoir of strength than we dreamed 
ten years ago. One might say that the 
downfall of Taft-Hartley was that its 
sponsors overestimated the ability of gov- 
ernment intervention to control private 
collective action. They underestimated 
the strength of laissez-faire. 
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